Container Registry and Software Supply Chain Platform · View 28 of 33 · 6 · Assurance
Decisions
- Every principal — human, build system, cluster node, controller — has a distinct identity; shared registry credentials do not exist
- The key zone accepts no inbound connection from the build zone except certificate issue, and that call is mTLS with a SPIFFE identity
- Artifacts and evidence are encrypted at rest with customer-managed keys and all traffic in transit
The assumed compromise
- A valid signature from a compromised build identity is an expected event, not a surprise
- Revocation of a builder identity invalidates its artifacts at admission without requiring their deletion
- Break-glass access to the control plane requires two-person authorisation, has a maximum session length, and alerts on use
Deliberately omitted
- Network segmentation below the zone level — VLANs and firewall rules are an infrastructure deliverable
- Threat model in full — this view shows the boundaries, not the attack tree