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Revocation Propagation

How a compromised builder stops being trusted, in minutes, without deleting anything.

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Detect Compromise Report Log Monitor Rekor anomaly Revoke SPIRE Entry Removed Fulcio Identity Banned Robot Account Disabled Publish Revocation List signed · versioned Bundle Rebuild signer allowlist Distribute Control Topic push Bundle Poll ≤ 5 min Refresh Enforcement Points p95 ≤ 5 min Cache Invalidated p100 ≤ 15 min Effect Next Admission Denies nothing deleted Running Pods Continue eviction is separate Account Affected Artifact List by signer identity Rebuild Plan under a new identity drain when replaced Revocation — Invalidate Without Deleting Person or role Application we own Security / platform Data store Queue / topic Interface / broker Decision point Risk / gap failure / alternate The blast radius of a compromised builder is bounded by revocation, not by deletion. v 1.0 · owner Security Architecture · date 2026-09

Decisions

  • Revocation is an identity operation: the SPIRE entry is removed, the Fulcio identity is banned, the robot account is disabled
  • The signer allowlist is rebuilt into a new policy bundle, so revocation propagates by the same path as any policy change
  • Artifacts are not deleted; they simply stop satisfying policy

Targets

  • Revocation to full enforcement-point propagation p95 ≤ 5 minutes, p100 ≤ 15 minutes
  • Every affected artifact is enumerable by signer identity, which is why signer identity is a column and not a blob
  • The rebuild plan names what must be rebuilt under a new identity

The bounded blast radius

  • Running pods continue to run; revocation changes the next admission, not the current state of the cluster
  • Draining them is the same phase-3 mechanism as verdict-change eviction
  • Air-gapped sites propagate on the transport interval, not the 5-minute target — and deny on revocation-list age