Certificate Lifecycle Service  ·  View 10 of 21  ·  Data

Data Architecture and Ownership

Four zones with four different rules about who may write, and one category of data that is deliberately absent.

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Four zones, four different rules about who may write and what may be rebuilt Declared — human-authored, reviewed, versioned. The control plane reconciles it and never edits it. CA hierarchy git, two-person review Issuance profiles git Renewal and revocation policy git Owner directory sourced from the org Immutable evidence — append-only, retention-bound, no operator can edit or delete Issuance ledger S3 Object Lock, 10 y Ceremony records witnessed, 10 y Validation evidence 3 y Revocation records CA life + 1 y Derived — rebuildable from the ledger plus one full probe sweep, and that rebuild is rehearsed annually Certificate registry DynamoDB, ~70 k live Observed index 90 d full, 2 y aggregate Expiry projections recomputed each sweep Unmanaged findings owner + deadline Tenant-isolated — customer data, partitioned per tenant, deleted on exit Domain register 24,000 domains Delegation state proven_at, re-prove due Challenge tokens ephemeral, never logged Private keys generated in the workload, never stored here Certificate Lifecycle Service — Data Architecture and Ownership The zone that is not drawn as a store is the point: no private key material exists anywhere in this platform, which is a consequence of CSR-only issuance rather than an access control. v 1.0 · owner Data Architecture · date 2026-09

The rules per zone

  • Declared: human-authored, reviewed, versioned in git. The control plane reconciles it and never edits it, so a running system cannot quietly become its own policy authority.
  • Immutable evidence: append-only, retention-bound, no operator edit or delete. S3 Object Lock, not an IAM policy.
  • Derived: rebuildable from the ledger plus one full probe sweep — and that rebuild is rehearsed annually rather than assumed.
  • Tenant-isolated: partitioned per tenant, deleted on exit, challenge tokens never logged.

What is not here

  • No private key material exists anywhere in this platform. That is a consequence of CSR-only issuance, not an access control on a store — which means a full compromise of the platform's databases yields no key.
  • It also means a backup restore cannot revive a key that should be gone.

Assumption

  • Registry RPO 0, RTO ≤ 30 minutes; the ledger is the fallback source of truth for a rebuild.