Autoscaling Controller  ·  View 33 of 37  ·  6 · Assurance

Trust Zones

Five zones, and every crossing authenticated and labelled.

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Untrusted · human and external Operator Entra + MFA Forecast Vendor signed payload Compromised Source assumed possible Control surface · private Control API RBAC · private only Policy Repository reviewed changes Signal plane · read only Collectors read identity Qualification Gate reject unsigned Decision plane · writes state Decision Engine write identity Desired State no capacity access Actuation plane · changes capacity Reconciler actuate identity Capacity APIs scoped to groups OIDC + MFA signed feed rejected config only qualified signals desired write desired read scoped mTLS Trust Zones — Every Crossing Authenticated Person or role External / third party Risk / gap Interface / broker Application we own Decision point Data store synchronous failure / alternate The signal path and the capacity path never share an identity. Compromising a metrics source cannot change a single instance. v 1.0 · owner Data & AI Global Practice · date 2026-09

Decisions

  • The signal path and the capacity path never share an identity, so compromising a metrics source cannot change a single instance.
  • The control API is private-only and never reachable from the internet; operators arrive through Entra ID with MFA.
  • An unsigned or unknown source is rejected at the qualification gate, before its value can reach a policy.

The threat this answers

  • A compromised metrics exporter reporting fabricated load is the cheapest attack on any autoscaler, and it costs money or availability depending on which direction it lies in.
  • Plausibility clamping bounds the damage, source authentication prevents it, and identity separation means the blast radius stops at the signal plane.

Assumptions

  • All data encrypted in transit and at rest. The controller holds and ingests no customer payload data at any point.