1. Edge Security & Attestation advanced

    A fleet platform decides to require a fresh hardware attestation on every device connection. The gateway issues a nonce, the device returns a boot measurement signed inside its secure element, and only measurements on an allow-list are admitted. The team gets replay resistance and firmware integrity. What have they given up, and when does that bill arrive?

    3 min answer attestationsecure-bootallow-listrecovery-path
  2. Edge Security & Attestation beginner Multiple choice

    A gateway requires each device to prove it is running approved firmware. The device sends a signed measurement of its boot image, and the gateway verifies the signature against the device's registered key. Why is a valid signature not yet evidence that this device is trustworthy right now?

    2 min answer attestationtpmreplaynonce
  3. Edge Security & Attestation advanced

    An attacker has physical possession of one of your devices. What should they be able to obtain, and what protects the rest of the fleet?

    2 min answer attestationphysical-securityleast-privilegesecure-boot
  4. Edge Security & Attestation advanced

    How do you establish that code running on a remote device or accelerator is what you deployed?

    2 min answer attestationsecure-boothardware-rootintegrity
  5. Edge Security & Attestation advanced

    In June 2024 Apple described Private Cloud Compute, where a user's device will only send a request to a server node that cryptographically attests to running a specific software image, and the device checks that measurement against a public append-only transparency log before sending anything. What problem does this solve that signed code and audits do not, what does it cost, and where would copying it be a mistake?

    3 min answer appleattestationtransparency-logconfidential-computing