LinkedIn Professional Network · View 27 of 30 · 7 · Assurance
Decisions
- The edge authenticates nothing. The API layer turns a session into a principal, and only principals reach services
- Service-to-service traffic is mTLS. Authorization is a central ACL service enforced inside each service, with access logs sent through Kafka (LinkedIn, 2019)
- Member privacy policy is checked on every read path, not only at the gateway
Controls
- Encryption in transit everywhere, and at rest with envelope keys from KMS
- Secrets are fetched at start-up on short leases; no secret lives in config
- Scraping defence: per-member and per-IP rate limits, plus bot scoring at the edge
Risks
- Scraping public profiles is the persistent threat. Rate limits and bot detection raise its cost; they do not end it
- A compromised internal service is contained by ACLs, not by network zones alone