Customer 360 Enterprise Data Platform — Denodo on Azure · View 35 of 39 · Assurance
The trade-off, stated plainly
- The source sees the platform identity, not the user. Pass-through authentication was rejected because SAP and Salesforce cannot express the enterprise role model — a region-scoped, book-scoped, column-masked entitlement has no equivalent in either.
- The filter is therefore applied where the model exists, which is Denodo. The consequence is that source-side audit shows a service account, and the user-level record lives in Sentinel instead. That is an accepted, documented gap, not an oversight.
Decisions
- Entra ID is the single identity provider; group claims map to Denodo roles, and roles map to view grants. No entitlement is expressed in a consumer application.
- Every source credential is leased from Key Vault for 60 minutes. There is no long-lived secret in a configuration file anywhere in the estate.
- Every query is audited with the principal, the view, the row count and the masks applied — enough to answer who saw what without storing what they saw.
Risks
- Group sprawl in Entra ID. Roles are provisioned from a small set of named groups with quarterly attestation, because an entitlement model nobody reviews is an entitlement model that only grows.