Container Registry and Software Supply Chain Platform  ·  View 33 of 33  ·  6 · Assurance

Failure Modes and Degraded Operation

Every named failure class, how it is detected, what the platform does, and what risk is left over.

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Failure Detected by Degraded behaviour Residual risk Artifact read path Registry pull down Pull SLO burn rate Node and regional cache serve Cold digest scale-out fails Artifact write path Registry push down Push error rate Builds queue and back off Release-day backlog Decision point Policy service unreachable Bundle age metric Cached bundle ≤ 30 min Beyond that, env posture Transparency and keys Rekor or Vault down Signing error rate Proofs queue, verify continues Unproofed: non-prod only Intelligence Scanner backlog, feed stale Queue age and feed lag Production scanned first No scan, no production Evidence integrity Missing attestation, bit-rot Digest re-verified on read Quarantine and alert Absent evidence is a denial Time and replication Clock skew, replication lag Bounded tolerance check Distinct retryable reason Denied, never allowed Policy change Bundle misconfiguration Dry run over last 24 h Override needed over 2% Override is still human Failure Modes and Degraded Operation Risk / gap Security / platform Application we own Decision point Every degraded behaviour is a stated policy choice. None of them is a silent allow. v 1.0 · owner SRE and Security · date 2026-09

The rule

  • Absent evidence is a denial. Nothing is trusted because nobody checked it
  • Every degraded behaviour is a stated policy choice recorded in the bundle, never a library default
  • None of the degraded paths is a silent allow

Recoverability

  • The platform is recoverable from the evidence store and blob store alone
  • Loss of the metadata store or the component index is a rebuild, not a data loss
  • Digest is re-verified on read at the enforcement point; a mismatch quarantines the artifact and alerts

What still needs a decision

  • Whether development really tolerates fail-open, or whether that is convenience arguing with the threat model
  • Whether a changed verdict should evict running workloads, and who owns the disruption budget if it does
  • Whether 7-year retention is what audit actually requires, or an assumption that has never been tested against the obligation