Cloud Development Environment Platform · View 05 of 21 · People and journeys
What this settles
- An agent cannot tell a slow platform from a hung one, so capacity pressure must surface as an explicit, classed, retryable refusal — never as silent queueing.
- Agent workspaces default to deny-by-default egress with a registry proxy, which is why the trough sits at "npm install blocked" rather than at "my dependency exfiltrated a token" (ADR-06).
- The session record — commands, destinations, files changed, diff — outlives the workspace, because the workspace is gone in seven minutes and the question about it arrives later.
Assumptions
- Agent sessions are 65% of starts with a 7-minute median life; bursts reach 10× steady-state creation for 60 seconds.
- Brokered git credentials are scoped to one repository and expire in 15 minutes.
Risks
- A prompt-injected agent is the untrusted-code case the sandbox exists for; it must not get a weaker boundary than a human's workspace, however convenient that would be.
- Unbounded fan-out from one task is indistinguishable from abuse until a ceiling says otherwise, so the ceiling is per principal, not only per tenant.