AI Agent Orchestration Platform  ·  View 29 of 32  ·  6 · Assurance and delivery

Identity and Delegation

The path from a user signing in to a tool credential, and what is deliberately not passed along it.

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User API Management Microsoft Entra ID Admission Service Runtime Worker Credential Broker Key Vault Downstream Tool 1. sign in, PKCE + MFA 2. id and access token 3. run agent, bearer 4. validate audience and scope 5. forward with caller claims 6. mint agent identity token 7. agent token, narrow scope 8. dispatch with agent token 9. request tool credential 10. check binding and approval 11. fetch by reference 12. 15 minute scoped token 13. invoke with scoped token 14. denied, not in grant Identity and Delegation — From User Sign-In to Tool Credential The user token never leaves the perimeter. An agent gets its own identity, and the intersection of user and agent grant is what it can do. v 1.0 · owner Security Architecture · date 2026-08

Decisions

  • The user's token never leaves the perimeter; the runtime receives an agent identity token with a narrow, purpose-scoped audience
  • What an agent may do is the intersection of the caller's grant and the agent's own grant, never the union
  • Tool credentials are brokered per call and live 15 minutes; the worker never holds a long-lived secret and never sees the vault directly

Mechanisms

  • Entra workload identity federation for service-to-service; no client secrets in any workload
  • On-behalf-of exchange where a tool genuinely requires end-user context, recorded in the audit ledger with both identities
  • Credential rotation on a 90-day schedule, and immediate revocation propagating within the token lifetime

Risks

  • Revocation is bounded by token lifetime; a 15-minute window of residual access after revocation is accepted and documented
  • On-behalf-of chains are hard to reason about at depth; delegation depth for OBO is capped at one hop