Enterprise Metadata Management System  ·  View 20 of 22  ·  Assurance

Security Trust Zones

Where the boundaries are, what authenticates at each crossing, and why metadata is treated as sensitive.

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Untrusted · internet
Untrusted · internet
Catalog user
managed device
Catalog user...
Automation client
service principal
Automation client...
Metadata scraper
column-name harvest
Metadata scraper...
Perimeter · DMZ
Perimeter · DMZ
WAF + DDoS
WAF + DDoS
Load balancer
TLS 1.3
Load balancer...
API Gateway
OIDC · quota
API Gateway...
Application · private subnets
Application · private subnets
Metadata services
mTLS mesh
Metadata services...
Policy decision point
ABAC
Policy decision point...
Entra ID
MFA · SCIM
Entra ID...
Metadata · restricted
Metadata · restricted
Aspect Store
KMS at rest
Aspect Store...
Knowledge Graph
Knowledge Graph
Search Index
per-domain aliases
Search Index...
Audit Log
write-once · 7 y
Audit Log...
Source estate · least privilege
Source estate · least privilege
Ingestion agent
outbound 443 only
Ingestion agent...
Read-only role
catalog views only
Read-only role...
Source systems
Source systems
HTTPS 443
HTTPS 443
client credentials
client credentials
rate limited
rate limited
mTLS + token
mTLS + token
authorise
authorise
TLS · scoped role
TLS · scoped role
every action
every action
mTLS outbound
mTLS outbound
read-only metadata
read-only metadata
Security Architecture — Trust Zones
Security Architecture — Trust Zones
Person or role
Person or role
External / third party
External / third party
Risk / gap
Risk / gap
Security / platform
Security / platform
Interface / broker
Interface / broker
Application we own
Application we own
Data store
Data store
synchronous
synchronous
failure / alternate
failure / alternate
event / async
event / async
batch
batch
Metadata leaks too. No data values are persisted; profile statistics are bounded, and sample values are never stored for confidential or restricted assets.
Metadata leaks too. No data values are persisted; profile statistics are bounded, and sample values are never stored for confidential or restricted assets.
v 1.0 · owner Security Architecture · date 2026-08
v 1.0 · owner Security Architecture · date 2026-08
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The premise

  • Metadata leaks. Column names, classifications and profile statistics describe the data precisely enough to be worth attacking, so the catalog is classified at the level of the most sensitive asset it describes.
  • No data values are persisted. Profile statistics are bounded, and no sample values are stored at all for confidential or restricted assets.
  • The ingestion agent holds read-only source credentials in a KMS-backed vault and connects outbound only; the platform never holds a write path into a source.

Controls

  • OIDC with MFA for people, client credentials for automation, mTLS between services.
  • ABAC on domain plus sensitivity label; per-domain index aliases so a search cannot reach outside an entitlement.
  • Encryption at rest with customer-managed keys, TLS 1.3 in transit, annual key rotation.

Residual risk

  • A broad service principal is the most attractive target in the system — it can enumerate the entire estate. Automation credentials are scoped per domain, short-lived, and their read volume is baselined and alerted on.