Deliverables

The curriculum covers what an architect should know. This covers what an architect actually hands over: 55 artifacts, each with a worked example, a note on when it is worth producing, who reads it, and the ways it usually goes wrong. Filter by the artifact's type, the kind of engagement that calls for it, the stack or industry it is drawn against, or the audience it is written for.

Identify the deliverable → 42 diagrams, shown one at a time with the answer withheld. Nothing to submit.

7 of 55 deliverables shown.

flowchart LR
  subgraph cust["Customer"]
    direction TB
    c1(["Submits claim"])
  end
  subgraph intake["Intake — automated"]
    direction TB
    a1["Validate policy"]
    a2{"Policy active<br/>and in cover?"}
    a3["Auto-assess<br/><i>rules + model</i>"]
    a4{"Confidence<br/>&ge; threshold?"}
  end
  subgraph handler["Claims Handler"]
    direction TB
    h1["Manual review"]
    h2{"Approve?"}
  end
  subgraph fin["Finance"]
    direction TB
    p1["Schedule payment"]
  end

  c1 --> a1 --> a2
  a2 -->|"no"| r1(["Reject — notify with reason"])
  a2 -->|"yes"| a3 --> a4
  a4 -->|"yes"| p1
  a4 -->|"no"| h1 --> h2
  h2 -->|"yes"| p1
  h2 -->|"no"| r2(["Decline — notify with appeal route"])
  p1 --> e1(["Paid"])
Behavioural View

BPMN Process Diagram

A business process as tasks in swim lanes with explicit decision points and handoffs, where crossing a lane boundary is the interesting event.

Business Processes Discovery
flowchart TB
  subgraph fwd["Forward path"]
    direction LR
    f1["1. Reserve stock"] --> f2["2. Authorise payment"] --> f3["3. Create consignment"] --> f4["4. Capture payment"] --> f5["5. Despatch"]
  end
  subgraph comp["Compensation"]
    direction RL
    k1["Release stock"] --- k2["Void authorisation"] --- k3["Cancel consignment"] --- k4["Refund<br/><i>visible to customer</i>"]
  end
  f1 -.->|"undo"| k1
  f2 -.->|"undo"| k2
  f3 -.->|"undo"| k3
  f4 -.->|"undo"| k4
  f5 -.->|"no undo — goods have left"| x(["point of no return"])
Behavioural View

Saga Compensation Flow

A multi-service transaction as forward steps each paired with an undo, showing where the sequence becomes irreversible.

flowchart LR
  s1[("core_banking.accounts<br/><i>source</i>")]
  s2[("payments.transactions<br/><i>source</i>")]
  s3[("crm.customer<br/><i>source</i>")]

  j1{{"job: cdc_ingest<br/><i>hourly</i>"}}
  j2{{"job: conform_party<br/><i>daily 02:00</i>"}}
  j3{{"job: build_balances<br/><i>daily 03:15</i>"}}
  j4{{"job: reg_extract<br/><i>monthly</i>"}}

  r1[("raw.accounts")]
  r2[("raw.transactions")]
  c1[("clean.party")]
  c2[("clean.balance_daily")]
  o1[("report.capital_adequacy")]
  o2["Dashboard:<br/>Treasury Daily"]

  s1 --> j1 --> r1
  s2 --> j1 --> r2
  s3 --> j2
  r1 --> j2 --> c1
  r1 --> j3
  r2 --> j3 --> c2
  c1 --> j3
  c2 --> j4 --> o1
  c2 --> o2
Data View

Data Lineage Graph

Which dataset was derived from which, through what job — the artifact you produce when someone asks where a number came from.

flowchart LR
  subgraph t4["Restricted"]
    direction TB
    a1["Card PAN · health records<br/>government ID images"]
    a2["<i>controls:</i> tokenise at edge<br/>field encryption · CMK<br/>no non-prod copies<br/>access JIT + approved<br/>full audit"]
  end
  subgraph t3["Confidential"]
    direction TB
    b1["Personal data · salary<br/>contracts · pricing"]
    b2["<i>controls:</i> encrypt at rest + transit<br/>masked in non-prod<br/>RBAC + quarterly review<br/>DLP on egress"]
  end
  subgraph t2["Internal"]
    direction TB
    c1["Operational metrics<br/>internal docs"]
    c2["<i>controls:</i> authenticated access<br/>standard retention"]
  end
  subgraph t1["Public"]
    direction TB
    d1["Published pricing<br/>marketing content"]
    d2["<i>controls:</i> integrity only"]
  end

  t4 --> s1[("Core DB · EU · Restricted")]
  t3 --> s1
  t3 --> s2[("Warehouse · EU · Confidential")]
  t2 --> s2
  t2 --> s3[("Object store · Internal")]
  t1 --> s3
Security View

Data Classification Map

Which data sits in which sensitivity tier, where it lives, and the specific controls each tier obliges — so protection follows the label automatically.

flowchart TB
  hsm[("HSM / Key Service<br/><i>root of trust · FIPS 140-2 L3</i>")]
  cmk["Customer Master Key<br/><i>per environment · rotate 1y</i>"]
  dek["Data Encryption Keys<br/><i>per dataset · rotate 90d</i>"]

  hsm --> cmk -->|"wraps"| dek

  subgraph vault["Secret Store"]
    direction TB
    v1["Static secrets<br/><i>rotate 90d</i>"]
    v2["Dynamic credentials<br/><i>DB · TTL 1h</i>"]
    v3["PKI issuer<br/><i>mTLS certs · TTL 24h</i>"]
  end
  cmk -->|"encrypts vault at rest"| vault

  subgraph wl["Workloads"]
    direction TB
    w1["Service A<br/><i>workload identity</i>"]
    w2["Pipeline<br/><i>OIDC federation</i>"]
  end

  w1 -->|"attests identity — no stored secret"| vault
  w2 -->|"short-lived token — no stored secret"| vault
  vault -->|"lease · auto-renew · revocable"| w1
  dek -->|"envelope decrypt"| w1
  audit[("Audit log<br/><i>every issue and revoke</i>")]
  vault --> audit
Security View

Key & Secret Management Diagram

Where keys and secrets live, what wraps what, how workloads get them without a stored credential, and how rotation actually happens.

flowchart LR
  user(["Customer<br/><i>untrusted</i>"])
  admin(["Admin<br/><i>privileged</i>"])

  subgraph edge["Boundary 1 — public edge"]
    cdn["CDN / WAF"]
  end

  subgraph app["Boundary 2 — application tier"]
    direction TB
    api["Order API"]
    auth["Auth Service"]
  end

  subgraph datab["Boundary 3 — data tier"]
    direction TB
    db[("Order Store<br/><i>PII + card token</i>")]
    kms[("Key Vault")]
  end

  ext["Payment Provider<br/><i>third party</i>"]

  user -->|"F1 HTTPS"| cdn
  cdn -->|"F2 HTTPS + mTLS"| api
  admin -->|"F3 admin console"| api
  api -->|"F4 token introspection"| auth
  api -->|"F5 TLS + parameterised"| db
  api -->|"F6 fetch DEK"| kms
  api -->|"F7 HTTPS outbound"| ext
  ext -->|"F8 webhook — signed"| cdn
Security View

Threat Model Data Flow Diagram

Processes, stores and flows with trust boundaries drawn across them, so that every boundary crossing can be enumerated for threats.