Deliverables

The curriculum covers what an architect should know. This covers what an architect actually hands over: 55 artifacts, each with a worked example, a note on when it is worth producing, who reads it, and the ways it usually goes wrong. Filter by the artifact's type, the kind of engagement that calls for it, the stack or industry it is drawn against, or the audience it is written for.

Identify the deliverable → 42 diagrams, shown one at a time with the answer withheld. Nothing to submit.

6 of 55 deliverables shown.

flowchart TB
  root["Organisation Root<br/><i>policy: deny unapproved regions</i>"]

  subgraph plat["Platform"]
    direction TB
    ident["Identity<br/><i>directory, privileged access</i>"]
    conn["Connectivity<br/><i>hub VNet/VPC, firewall, DNS, VPN</i>"]
    mgmt["Management<br/><i>logs, backup, monitoring</i>"]
  end

  subgraph land["Landing Zones"]
    direction TB
    subgraph corp["Corporate"]
      p1["Prod A<br/><i>spoke</i>"]
      n1["Non-Prod A<br/><i>spoke</i>"]
    end
    subgraph online["Internet-Facing"]
      p2["Prod B<br/><i>spoke</i>"]
      n2["Non-Prod B<br/><i>spoke</i>"]
    end
  end

  sandbox["Sandbox<br/><i>spend cap, no connectivity, auto-expire</i>"]
  decom["Decommissioned<br/><i>deny all</i>"]

  root --> plat
  root --> land
  root --> sandbox
  root --> decom
  conn --- p1
  conn --- n1
  conn --- p2
  conn --- n2
  mgmt -.->|"diagnostics forwarded"| land
  ident -.->|"roles and groups"| land
Deployment & Infrastructure View

Cloud Landing Zone Diagram

The account, network, identity and policy scaffolding every future workload will be dropped into, drawn before the first workload exists.

Landing Zones Design
sequenceDiagram
  autonumber
  participant B as Browser
  participant A as App / BFF
  participant I as Identity Provider
  participant R as Resource API

  B->>A: GET /protected
  A-->>B: 302 to IdP (PKCE challenge, state, nonce)
  B->>I: authorise request
  I->>B: authenticate + MFA
  I-->>B: 302 back with authorisation code
  B->>A: code + state
  Note over A,I: back channel — browser never sees these
  A->>I: exchange code + PKCE verifier + client secret
  I-->>A: access token (10 min), refresh token, id token
  A->>A: store tokens server-side<br/>set HttpOnly SameSite cookie
  A-->>B: session cookie only
  B->>A: subsequent request + cookie
  A->>R: call with access token (Bearer)
  R->>I: fetch/refresh signing keys (JWKS, cached)
  R->>R: verify signature, issuer, audience,<br/>expiry, scope
  R-->>A: 200
  A-->>B: rendered response
  Note over A,I: on expiry the BFF refreshes<br/>with rotating refresh token
Security View

Authentication Flow Diagram

The exact token exchange between browser, application, authorisation server and API — including what is short-lived, what is bound and what never touches the browser.

flowchart LR
  user(["Customer<br/><i>untrusted</i>"])
  admin(["Admin<br/><i>privileged</i>"])

  subgraph edge["Boundary 1 — public edge"]
    cdn["CDN / WAF"]
  end

  subgraph app["Boundary 2 — application tier"]
    direction TB
    api["Order API"]
    auth["Auth Service"]
  end

  subgraph datab["Boundary 3 — data tier"]
    direction TB
    db[("Order Store<br/><i>PII + card token</i>")]
    kms[("Key Vault")]
  end

  ext["Payment Provider<br/><i>third party</i>"]

  user -->|"F1 HTTPS"| cdn
  cdn -->|"F2 HTTPS + mTLS"| api
  admin -->|"F3 admin console"| api
  api -->|"F4 token introspection"| auth
  api -->|"F5 TLS + parameterised"| db
  api -->|"F6 fetch DEK"| kms
  api -->|"F7 HTTPS outbound"| ext
  ext -->|"F8 webhook — signed"| cdn
Security View

Threat Model Data Flow Diagram

Processes, stores and flows with trust boundaries drawn across them, so that every boundary crossing can be enumerated for threats.

flowchart LR
  u1(["Employee<br/><i>managed laptop</i>"])
  u2(["Contractor<br/><i>unmanaged device</i>"])
  u3["Workload<br/><i>service identity</i>"]

  subgraph pep["Policy Enforcement"]
    direction TB
    px["Proxy / Gateway<br/><i>terminates every session</i>"]
  end

  subgraph pdp["Policy Decision"]
    direction TB
    eng{"Policy engine"}
    sig1["Identity + MFA"]
    sig2["Device posture"]
    sig3["Risk + location"]
    sig4["Resource sensitivity"]
    sig1 --> eng
    sig2 --> eng
    sig3 --> eng
    sig4 --> eng
  end

  subgraph res["Resources"]
    direction TB
    r1["Internal app"]
    r2[("Database")]
    r3["SaaS"]
  end

  u1 --> px
  u2 --> px
  u3 --> px
  px <-->|"authorise this request"| eng
  px -->|"allow · scoped · time-bound"| r1
  px -->|"allow · read-only"| r2
  px -->|"deny · posture fail"| r3
  log[("Decision log<br/><i>every allow and deny</i>")]
  eng --> log
Security View

Zero Trust Architecture Diagram

Access decided per request from identity, device and context rather than from network position, with the policy decision point drawn explicitly.

gantt
  title Target state — 18 months
  dateFormat YYYY-MM-DD
  axisFormat %b %y

  section Foundation
  Landing zone and connectivity      :done,   f1, 2026-01-01, 60d
  Identity federation                :done,   f2, after f1, 45d
  Observability baseline             :active, f3, after f1, 75d

  section Decouple
  Strangler facade at edge           :active, d1, 2026-03-15, 90d
  Extract order domain               :        d2, after d1, 120d
  Extract pricing domain             :        d3, after d2, 90d
  Retire shared order database       :crit,   d4, after d3, 60d

  section Data
  Ingest to raw zone                 :        a1, 2026-04-01, 75d
  Conformed customer entity          :        a2, after a1, 90d
  Retire nightly extract jobs        :        a3, after a2, 45d

  section Resilience
  Multi-zone for tier 0              :        r1, 2026-06-01, 60d
  Automated failover rehearsal       :        r2, after r1, 45d
  Second region for tier 0           :crit,   r3, after r2, 90d
Planning Artifact

Architecture Roadmap

The sequence of architectural change over time, grouped by theme, with dependencies visible and each bar tied to an outcome rather than a technology.